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DEAD MONEY: A POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILD'S INHERITANCE RIGHTS UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT & STATE INTESTACY
LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Jack and Jill were a young married couple. Three months
after theirwedding,
Jack was diagnosed with an aggressiveform of Leukemia.
Doctors advised Jack to undergo chemotherapy
immediately but indicated he was at a high risk of
becoming infertile. Knowing they wanted to have children
together someday, Jack and Jill had Jack's sperm frozen
and storedin a sperm bank.
Despite aggressive treatment, Jack's prognosis was poor
and it was obvious death was impending. The only solace
Jack had in his final days was his beliefJill would use his
frozen sperm to conceive a child after he died with assisted
reproductive technology. Eventually, Jack died at the
tender age of twenty six.
Eighteen months after Jack's death, Jill gave birth to twin
girls conceived using Jack's frozen sperm. Genetically,
the twin girls are Jack's children. Are the twins entitled to
receive benefits through Jack from the Social Security
Administration? Are the twins entitled to inheritfrom Jack
under intestate succession?
Posthumously conceived children-children conceived after the
death of one or both parents-have become increasingly common in recent
years.' The ability to conceive a deceased individual's child is made
possible by assisted reproductive technology (ART) such as in vitro
fertilization and artificial insemination.2 Furthermore, cryopreservation-a
method of freezing reproductive cells for future use-allows sperm, eggs,
1 See Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: NationalART Success Rates,

CTRS.

nccd.cdc.gov/DRHART
/Apps/NationalSummaryReport.aspx (last updated August 13, 2013) (detailing national rates of
assisted reproductive technology resulting in successful pregnancies in 2012).
2 See infra Part II.A (elucidating methods of conceive children posthumously).
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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and embryos to be stored for lengthy periods of time enabling their
procreative use for an indeterminate number of years post-death.3
An inherent problem in this process involves the inheritance rights
of such offspring in terms of social security benefits and under intestate
succession. 4 Under the Social Security Act, a posthumously conceived
child's right to inherit under the applicable state's intestacy statute is
dispositive of that child's right to receive social security benefits.5
Accordingly, if a child qualifies for intestate succession under the
applicable state law, that child can also receive social security benefits
through a deceased wage earning parent.6 If a child of postmortem
conception is ineligible to inherit as an heir at law under the applicable
state's intestacy statute,
that child is also precluded from receiving social
7
security benefits.
Unfortunately, state legislatures have failed to keep pace with
scientific development and only eleven states sufficiently address how to
resolve issues dispositive of whether a posthumously conceived child can
inherit under intestate succession.8 To be specific, the basic rule of
intestate succession prescribes that a decedent's closest relatives should
inherit first. 9 Therefore, the existence of a parent-child relationship
between a decedent and a posthumously conceived child must be
established at the outset. 1° The preceding determination, however, does not
end the analysis."
Traditionally, administration of a decedent's estate
occurs at the time of death. 12 Given that posthumously conceived children
are not alive at the time of death, it must then be ascertained whether they

3 See infra Part II.B (explaining cryopreservation).
4 See infra Part III.A (describing relationship between social security benefits and state

intestacy laws).
5 See infra Part III.A (expounding how parallel between Social Security Act and state
intestacy law is double-edged sword).
6 See infra Part III.A (discussing how Social Security Act defers to state law for inheritance
rights).
7 See infra Part III.A.i (summarizing Astrue v. Capato, which held state law determines
claimant's entitlement to social security benefits).
8 See infra Part III.A.ii.1
(exploring inadequacy of statutes governing inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children).
9 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (reviewing general rule of intestate
succession).
10 See Andrew S. Felts, Note, What Sex-Ed Didn't Teach You: Addressing the Inadequacies
of West Virginia Code Section 42-1-8 and the Future of Posthumously Conceived Children, 114
W. VA. L. REv. 239, 253 (2011) (acknowledging importance of establishing parentage to validate
inheritance rights under intestate succession).
11See infra notes 57, 92-93 and accompanying text (implying existence of parent-child

relationship may not be enough to secure inheritance rights).
12 See infra Part IV.C (advocating importance of expedient conception post-death).
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can still inherit through intestate succession. 13
Without express legislation addressing the inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children for purposes of intestate succession, state
courts have been forced to act in the interim.' 4 As a result, two
predominant approaches have emerged. 15 For example, some states have
adopted a broader approach, which gives effect to the intent of the
decedent. 16 Alternatively, some states follow a narrower approach, which
gives effect to legislative intent. 17 There is, however, some flexibility
regarding what state law applies.' 8 This is because the Social Security Act
provides the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his or
her death governs, which may be subject to interpretation. 19
Ultimately, for a posthumously conceived child to qualify for
social security benefits, it is clear state intestacy legislation must expressly
permit such child to inherit, or at least be sufficiently ambiguous to permit
that interpretation.20
Ergo, to procreate posthumously and secure
inheritance rights for any resulting children, there are various factors that
should be considered to enhance the likelihood of success. 21 For example,
marriage, execution of a will, expedient conception, and utilizing the
ambiguity of domicile are all ways to help achieve that end.22 Additionally,
emphasizing a state's past reliance on uniform acts like the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) and/or Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) may persuade a
court to adopt law modeled after such acts until the applicable state
legislature responds.23
This note begins with Part II.A through Part liB, which discuss the
13

See infra notes 86-89 (elaborating two-part inquiry critical to ascertain posthumously

conceived child's inheritance rights under intestate succession).
14

See infra Part III.A.ii.2 (discussing current case law and role of courts in governing

inheritance rights).
15 See infra Part III.A.ii.2 (introducing broad approach and narrower approach adopted by
courts).
16

See infra Part III.A.ii.2.b (providing states such as Massachusetts and New Jersey have

taken broader approach).
17

See infra Part III.A.ii.2.c (revealing states like Arkansas and Iowa have adopted

narrower approach).
18 See infra Part III.A.iii.3 (analyzing ambiguity of "domicile").

19 See infra Part III.A.i (addressing Social Security Act).
20 See infra Part III.A (detailing problematic and unsettled state of law controlling
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children).
21 See infra Part IV (proffering different ways to successfully conceive and provide for
children of postmortem conception).
22 See infra Part IV (demonstrating why marriage, wills, expedient conception post-death,
and forum shopping should be practical considerations).
23 See infra Part IV (elaborating why emphasizing past reliance on uniform acts may be
persuasive).

2015]

CHILD'SINHERITANCE RIGHTS

different methods of assisted reproductive technology that allow children to
be conceived posthumously, including: In vitro fertilization; Artificial
insemination; and Cryopreservation. 24 Part II.C evaluates the phenomenon
of posthumously conceived children.25 Part III reviews statutes and case
law to exemplify the dependent relationship between the Social Security
Act and state intestacy law.26 Finally, Part IV analyzes what prospective
parents should do when considering posthumous conception to enhance the
ability to procreate post-death and provide for any resulting children.27

II. HISTORY
A. Methods of Reproduction EnablingPosthumous Conception Assisted
Reproductive Technology
Assisted reproductive technology includes any effort to achieve
pregnancy by means other than sexual intercourse.28 In vitro fertilization
(1VF) and artificial insemination, otherwise known as intrauterine
insemination (IUI), are two kinds of ART commonly used to conceive
children posthumously.2 9
1. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)
IVF is when a woman's eggs and a man's sperm are combined in a
24
25

See infra Part II.A (reviewing ART).
See infra Part II.C (distinguishing between posthumously born and posthumously

conceived children).
26 See infra Part III.A (evaluating current state of law regarding posthumously conceived
children).
27 See infra Part IV (suggesting what prospective parents should consider).
28 See Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD.
MED. (2011), www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/Resources/Patient
Resources/FactSheets and Info Booklets/art.pdf (including glossary of commonly used ART
terms); see also Reproductive Health: Infertility FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, at 17 (June 20, 2013), www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealtl/infertility/ (answering
frequently asked questions concerning infertility). Eggs are "[t]he female sex cell[s] (ovum[s]
produced by the ovary, which, when fertilized by a male sperm, produces an embryo." Assisted
Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supra, at 23 (defining customary ART
language). Sperm is "[t]he male reproductive cells that fertilize a woman's egg." Id. at 27
(defining customary ART terms).
29 See Reproductive Health: Infertility FAQs, supra note 28 (defining ART);
see also
Intrauterine Insemination
(IUI),
AM.
SOC Y
FOR
REPROD.
MED.
(2012),
www.reproductivefacts.org/factsheet intrauterine insemination lUI/ (delineating intrauterine
insemination).
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laboratory dish outside of the body.30 The fusion of sperm and egg(s)
enables fertilization, which creates an embryo necessary to conceive a
child.3' Subsequently, one or more embryos are inserted into a woman's
uterus to facilitate pregnancy.32 If there are excess embryos, they "may be
cryopreserved (frozen) for future use. 33 A basic IVF treatment cycle
includes five basic steps: (1) ovarian stimulation, (2) egg retrieval, (3)
fertilization, (4) embryo culture, and (5) embryo transfer.34
2. Artificial Insemination/Intrauterine Insemination (IUI)
IUI is a process that plants sperm directly into a woman's uterus
during ovulation-the time when eggs are released from a woman's
ovaries. 35 In a natural pregnancy, sperm must travel from a woman's
vagina through her cervix, into her uterus, and up into one of her fallopian
tubes.36 The amount of sperm that enter a woman's uterus and reach her
fallopian tube(s) is generally low. 37 By planting sperm directly into a
30

Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supra note 28, at 4 (providing

comprehensible patient's guide to assisted reproductive technologies); see also Assisted
Reproductive Technology, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NAT'L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH &
HUMAN DEV. (July 07, 2013), www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/
infertility/conditioninfo/Pages/art.aspx (highlighting contrasting types of assisted reproductive
technology).
31 Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supra note 28, at 4 (defining
terminology frequently associated with procreation).
32 Id.at 23-28 (including list of commonly used ART
words).
33 Id. at 4 (summarizing IVF process); see IntrauterineInsemination (UI), supra note 29
(describing cryopreservation as method of fertility preservation).
34 Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supra note 28, at 4 (describing
steps of IVF); see Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30 (giving brief overview of
IVF treatment cycle). Sources slightly differ on the names of each step in the IVF treatment cycle
and some sources combine one or more of the steps. Compare Assisted Reproductive
Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supra note 28, at 4 (citing five steps in an IVF treatment
cycle), and IV]F Step-by-Step, UNIV. OF ROCHESTER MED. CTR.: DEP'T OF OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY (2013), www.urmc.rochester.edu/ob-gyn/fertility-center/ivf/ivf-step-by-step.aspx
(naming five steps in IVF treatment cycle with slightly different names), with Assisted
Reproductive Technology, supra note 30 (listing only four steps of IVF). The overall procedure,
however, is still the same. See, e.g., Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients,
supra note 28 (describing IVF process); Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30
(outlining how IVF works); IVF Step-by-Step, supra (exploring IVF steps).
35 See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30 (highlighting types of ART,
including IUI); Intrauterine Insemination (IUI), supra note 29 (summarizing artificial
insemination).
36 IntrauterineInsemination (UI), supra note 29 (briefing what happens during unassisted
pregnancy). If sperm reaches a woman's fallopian tube(s) shortly after an egg is released from
her ovaries, sperm and egg(s) can meet and fertilize. Id. (detailing process by which women
become pregnant).
37 Id.(describing issues with natural conception).
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woman's uterus, the chance of uniting egg(s) and sperm is greatly
increased because the trip to her fallopian tube(s) is much shorter.38
Ultimately, artificial insemination enhances a woman's ability to get
pregnant.39
3. Cryopreservation
The first reported human birth resulting from the use of frozen
sperm was in 1953, and in 1984, the first birth resulting from the use of a
frozen embryo was reported.4 ° In 1986, the first birth resulting from the
use of a frozen egg was reported; however, the use of frozen eggs to
reproduce is still relatively rare because they are the most difficult
reproductive cells to preserve for long periods.4'
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's
2012 Assisted Reproductive Technology Report, out of 456 reporting
clinics 38,150 individuals underwent assisted reproduction utilizing frozen
embryos from nondonor eggs.42 Of those ART cycles, thirty-eight percent
resulted in live births. 43 There were 8,893 couples who participated in
assisted reproductive technology using frozen embryos from donor eggs. 44
Of those procedures, approximately thirty-seven percent resulted in live
births.4 5 In total, reporting clinics claimed 8,730 children were born by
means of assisted reproductive technology using frozen embryos in 2011.46
This figure does not even account for non-reporting clinics and the number

38 Intrauterine (Artificial)Insemination (IUI), FERTILITY CTR. AT NYU LANGONE (2013),

www.nyufertilitycenter.org/infertility treatment/artificial-insemination (describing intrauterine
insemination).
39 See Intrauterine Insemination (IUI), supra note 29 (conveying basics of artificial
insemination).
40 Id. at 37 (discussing history of conception using cryopreserved reproductive material).
41 Id. (illuminating history of cryopreservation for reproductive purposes).
42 See Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: NationalART Success Rates, supra
note 1 (examining ART success rate using cryopreserved reproductive material); see also Jane
Marie Lewis, Note, New-Age Babies andAge-Old Laws: The Needfor an Intent-BasedApproach
in Tennessee to Preserve Parent-Child Succession for Children of Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 43 U. MEM. L. REv. 479, 480 (2012) (exploring how ART affects parent-child
succession).
43 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: NationalART Success Rates, supra note
1 (reporting how many couples utilized cryopreservation to conceive); see also Lewis, supra note
42, at 480 (discussing growth in births of posthumously conceived children).
44 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: NationalART Success Rates, supra note
1 (explaining statistics of ART participants).
45 Id. (indicating number of children born using frozen embryos from donor eggs).
46 See id. (discussing children conceived using cryopreserved reproductive material from

donors and nondonors).
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of children conceived posthumously from the use of frozen eggs or
47
sperm.
Cryopreservation of reproductive cells may be desirable to
individuals who are diagnosed with a medical condition whereby the
recommended treatment may result in infertility.48 Individuals who work
in high risk professions, like the military, may also view cryopreservation
as a viable option
to preserve fertility in the event of resultant impotence or
49

untimely death.

4. Posthumous Conception
Due to advancements in ART and the ability to cryopreserve
reproductive cells for lengthy periods of time, it is now possible to
conceive children post-death. 50 Initiating pregnancy after the death of one
or both biological parents is called posthumous conception
distinguishable from posthumous birth, which is when a biological parent
dies after the conception of a child but before the child's birth.si
"Posthumous conception challenges the validity of ...

[parentage]

...and inheritance laws by bluring the once bright lines between death
and life.", 52 Specifically, the distinction between posthumously conceived
and posthumously born children is particularly important in the context of
parentage and inheritance. 53 This is because in most states, a posthumously
47 C( id. (identifying percentage of children from reporting clinics born using cryopreserved
embryos in 2012).
48 See id. (defining cryopreservation and discussing its purpose).
49 See Frank Buckley, Insurance Policy: Troops Freezing Sperm, CNN (Jan. 30, 2003, 1:04

PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTHJ01/30/military.fertility/
index.html?iref-newssearch ("Troops say having their sperm frozen gives them peace of mind in
case of death or infertility."); see also Sperm Storage, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK,
http://fairfaxcryobank.com/spenm-storage.shtml (last visited Mar. 2013) (indicating their sperm
bank gives active duty military one year of free storage).
50 Renee H. Sekino, Posthumous Conception: The Birth of a New Class, Woodward v.
Commissioner
of
Social
Security,
LEGAL
UPDATE
(2001),
available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/scitech/volume81/sekino.pdf (forecasting
implications of posthumous conception regarding inheritance rights).
51 Id. (defining posthumous conception); see Brianne M. Star, Case Comment, A Matter of
Life and Death: Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REv. 613, 613 (2004) (discussing
posthumous conception).
52 Star, supra note 51, at 613 (exploring various dilemmas inherent with posthumous
conception).
53 See Felts, supra note 10, at 242 (distinguishing between posthumously born and
posthumously conceived children); see also Lisa Medford, Note, Family Law and Estate Law
Reproductive Technology-Use of Artificial Reproductive Technologies After the Death of a
Parent, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 91, 94 (2010) (discussing issues posthumously
conceived children face regarding inheritance rights).
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born child is deemed "in being" at the time of conception.54 Accordingly, a
posthumously born child is considered alive at the time of a parent's death
and will inherit through intestate succession accordingly.5 5 Alternatively, a
child conceived after the death of one or both biological parents is typically
not considered "in being" at the time death occurs. 5 6 Consequently, distinct
statutes and case law must be reviewed to establish whether a parent-child
relationship exists under the law and
what, if any, inheritance rights that
57
succession.
intestate
under
has
child
III. FACTS
A.Double-EdgedSword: The Dependent Relationship Between Social
Security Benefits and State Intestacy Law

1.Social Security Benefits
To provide a financial safety net for families, Congress enacted the
Social Security Act of 1939, which provides conditions under which
families can procure benefits through a deceased wage earner. 58 Two
provisions of the Act significantly govern a dependent child's right to

54 Felts, supra note

10, at 242 (distinguishing posthumously born and posthumously
conceived children); Medford, supra note 53, at 94 (maintaining posthumously born children are

protected under most state inheritance laws).

Some statutes are vague because they fail to

distinguish between posthumously born and posthumously conceived children. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 505 (West 2013) ("Posthumous children, born alive, shall be considered as though
living at the death of their parent [for purposes of intestate succession]."); D.C. CODE § 19-314
(2013) (generalizing rights of posthumous children). Therefore, case law analysis is critical to
identify the meaning of "posthumous children" as applied by courts in a jurisdiction with
ambiguous statutory law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 505 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 19-314
(2013).
55 Felts, supra note 10, at 242 (addressing inheritance rights of children born posthumously);
Medford, supra note 53, at 94 (noting how state intestacy laws afford protection to posthumously
born children).
56 Felts, supra note 10, at 242 (indicating inheritance and parentage analysis
differs
depending on when child in question was conceived); Medford, supra note 53, at 94
("[P]osthumously conceived children must overcome[] several burdens to prove they are the
lawful heirs of their deceased parent.").
57 See Felts, supra note 10, at 242 ("Consequently, an entirely different set of descent and
distribution legislation and case law is necessary in order to specifically deal with the issues
related to the posthumously conceived child.").
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2013); see also Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012)
(discussing 1939 amendment to Social Security Act, which included qualifications for child's
receipt of benefits); Andrew Chironna, Case Comment, Astrue v. Capato: Implications ]or
Posthumously Conceived Children, NAT'L ITALIAN AM. BAR Ass'N L.J. 2013, at 71 (explaining
purpose of Social Security Act of 1939).
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benefits upon the death of a wage earning parent. 59 The first is 42 U.S.C. §
416(e)(1), which provides in pertinent part: "The term 'child' means.., the
child or legally adopted child of an individual .
As the provision's
language suggests,61the meaning of child under the Social Security Act is
highly ambiguous.

Consequently, a posthumously conceived child's right to social
security benefits is largely determined by 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). 62 This
provision indicates a child's right to inherit through intestate succession is
dispositive of any right to social security benefits. 63 Therefore, if a child
qualifies to inherit under an applicable state's intestacy law, then that child
is also entitled to social security benefits.6 4 Conversely, if a child does not
qualify to inherit from a deceased parent under intestate succession, then
that child is also ineligible to receive social security benefits.65
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court unwaveringly declared a
child's right to social security benefits is determined by the intestacy law of66
the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his or her death.
In that case, the decedent, Robert Capato, was martied in 1999 and

'9 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2012) (defining "child" for purposes of social security
benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (indicating state intestacy law governs in determining
applicants' eligibility to receive social security benefits).
60 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1).
61 See id.
(defining "child" under Social Security Act); Capato, 132 S.Ct. at 2033 ("As we

have explained, § 416(e)(1)'s statement, '[t]he term 'child' means ... the child . . .of an

individual,' is a definition of scant utility without aid from neighboring provisions.").
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (identifying standard in determining whether child qualifies
for social security benefits).
63 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).

In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) provides the

following:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall
apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal
property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the
time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts
of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured
individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of
Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to
taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.
Id.

See id. (deferring to state law to determine eligibility social security benefits); Chironna,
supra note 58, at 72 (stating 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) is primary method of establishing
eligibility for receipt of benefits).
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (defining how to determine applicants' eligibility to inherit
social security benefits); Chironna, supra note 58, at 72 (instructing state intestacy law governs
posthumously conceived child's right to social security benefits).
66 Capato, 132 S.Ct. at 2033 (concluding deferring to state law is reasonable to determine
whether applicants qualify for benefits).
64
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diagnosed with esophageal cancer shortly thereafter.6 7 As a result, Robert
and his wife, Karen, arranged to have his sperm cryopreserved and stored
for future use.6 8
Notwithstanding Robert's cancer treatments, the Capatos were able
to conceive naturally, and Karen delivered their first son in August 2001.69
The couple expressed a desire to have more children; however, Robert
Capato died in March 2002.70 Eighteen months after Robert's death, Karen
Capato gave birth to twins who were conceived using Robert's
cryopreserved sperm. 7'
Subsequently, Karen Capato sought social security benefits for her
twins and the request was denied by the Social Security Administration
(SSA). 2 The SSA based their decision on Florida law because that is
where Robert Capato was domiciled at the time of his death. 71 "The
applicable Florida law states that a child born posthumously may inherit
through intestate succession only if conceived before the parent's death,
thus barring Karen and Robert's posthumously conceived
twins from
74
inheriting survivorship benefits through their father.,
Karen Capato appealed the SSA's determination all the way to the
United States Supreme Court.75 Capato argued the meaning of "child" as
defined by 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) applied in determining her twins' right to
76
benefits because § 416(h)(2)(A) only applied if paternity was in question.
67

Id. at 2025 (summarizing facts of case); see Chironna, supra note 58, at 72 (outlining

factual basis for decision in Capato);Kristine Knaplund, Argument Preview: Who is a Decedent's
"Child"?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/03/argument-preview-who-is-a-decedents-child/ (discussing factual history of Capato).
68 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (discussing what led Karen Capato to conceive children
posthumously and seek social security benefits); Chironna, supra note 58, at 72 (summarizing
facts of Capato case). The Capato's froze Robert's sperm to preserve his ability to have a child
with Karen if he became infertile from his cancer treatments. Chironna, supra note 58, at 72.
69 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (providing factual history of case); see Chironna, supra note
58, at 72 (reviewing facts of Capato case).
70 See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. (revealing decedent's intent to have more children).
71 Idat 2025 (giving very brief factual history of case); see Chironna, supra note 58, at 72
(saying plaintiff conceived twins using deceased husband's cryopreserved sperm); Knaplund,
supra note 67 (indicating plaintiff gave birth to twins eighteen months after husband's death).
72 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (discussing procedural posture of case); see Chironna, supra
note 58, at 73 (analyzing Capato);Knaplund, supra note 67 (giving background of Capato).
71 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (establishing that twins' eligibility was dependent on Florida
law); see Chironna, supra note 58, at 73 (explaining court's reasoning).
74 Chironna, supra note 58, at 73.
71 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; see Chironna, supra note 58, at 73 (describing Capato's
procedural history).
76 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029 (citing Capato's argument 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) irrelevant
in determining her twins' right to benefits); Chironna, supra note 58, at 74 (noting Karen
Capato's argument against the SSA's decision).
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The Court responded that Congress intended for § 416(h)(2)(A) to
supplement the ambiguous language of § 416(e)(1). 77 "In upholding the
decision to leave the issue to state law, the Court cited the benefit of state
law as a workable substitute for a burdening case-by-case determination of
whether a child was dependent on his or her parent's earnings. The SSA
has applied the law in this manner for the past seventy years in holding that
all applicants for child survivor benefits
satisfy § 416(h), which leaves the
78
determination to state intestacy law.",
Karen Capato also made an equal protection argument, asserting
the SSA's reading would only allow natural children to satisfy § 416(h).7 9
Capato alleged the SSA's interpretation of the Act treated posthumously
conceived children as 'an inferior subset of natural children who are
ineligible for government benefits simply because of their date of birth and
method of conception."' 0 However, the Court reasoned the construction of
the Act was reasonably related to the government's interest in reserving
benefits for dependent children who have lost a parent's financial support. 8'
The Court also expounded that the SSA's interpretation of the Act was
rationally related to minimizing its burden of having to establish a claimant
child's dependency on a case-by-case basis.82
2. Intestate Succession
When a person dies intestate-without a will-state intestacy law
applies to manage the decedent's estate. 83
Generally, property is
distributed to a decedent's heirs at law, who are defined by statute and
typically include close surviving relatives.8 4 The most common order of
distribution is as follows: (1) Spouse, or in some states, domestic partner;

132 S. Ct. at 2033 (explaining how § 416(h)(2)(A) and § 416(e)(1) work in
tandem); see Chironna, supra note 58, at 74 (reiterating Capato's holding that § 416(h)(2)(A)
supplements ambiguous definition of "child" in § 416(e)(1)).
78 Chironna, supra note 58, at 74-75.
79 Capato, 132 S.Ct. at 2033.
80 Id.
81 See id. (citing Ninth Circuit decisions concerning equal protection arguments regarding
77 Capato,

construction of Social Security Act). The Court applied rational basis review because there was
no showing that children of postmortem conception shared the characteristics that had induced the
Court's skepticism of classifications disadvantaging illegitimate children. See id.
82 See id. (delineating that it is practical to look
to state law).
83 CORNELL UNIV. LAW ScH., Intestate Succession, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Aug. 19,
2010),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intestate-succession (defining intestacy).
84 See Intestate Succession, supra note 83 (offering basic overview of intestate succession);
see also Fraserv. Tenney, 987 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (giving family cemetery plot
purchased by intestate decedent to lineal descendants).
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(2) Children, also commonly referred to as "issue"; (3) Parents, siblings,

nieces and nephews; (4) Next of kin; and (5) When the
decedent has no
85
heirs at law, any property escheats (reverts) to the state.
As the general rule of intestate succession implies, determining a
posthumously conceived child's eligibility to inherit as an heir at law
requires a two-part inquiry. 86 First, it is necessary to establish a parentchild relationship between the child of postmortem conception and the
deceased parent.8 7 If a parent-child relationship is demonstrated, then it is
critical to ascertain whether the child is entitled to inherit under the

applicable state's intestacy law. 88

Most states that address the issue

condition inheritance rights on conception occurring within a specific time
post-death .89
a.Statutes
Applying state law to substantiate a child's right to receive social
security benefits through a deceased parent is somewhat problematic; most
state legislatures have not addressed the parentage and inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children at all. 90 The omission is likely due in
85 Intestate Succession, supra note 83; see Fraser,987 S.W.2d at 798.

86 See Intestate Succession, supra note 83 ("The assets of the estate are passed on to the
decedent's heirs."); see also Felts, supra note 10, at 253 (summarizing issues involving
posthumously conceived children and intestacy).
87 Felts, supra note 10, at 253 (explicating two-part inquiry for determining whether
posthumously conceived child can inherit under state law).
88 See Felts, supra note 10, at 253 (noting sometimes there are prerequisites posthumously
conceived children must satisfy to inherit, despite established parentage); see also IOWA CODE §
633.220A (2013) (providing numerous factors posthumously conceived children must meet to
inherit under intestate succession).
89 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2013) (directing child be in gestation within two
years after decedent's death); COLO. REV. STAT. 15-11-120(11) (2013) (demanding child be in
gestation no later than thirty-six months after parent's death); D.C. CODE § 19-314 (2013)
(establishing child must be alive at death to inherit); IOWA CODE § 633.220A (2013) (mandating
child be born within two years); KY. REv. STAT. § 391.070 (2013) (indicating child must be born
within ten months after parent's death); MD. CODE, EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (2013) (requiring
child be in utero within two years); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-120(K) (2013) (stating child must be in
gestation no later than thirty-six months); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 30.1-04-19(11) (2013) (requiring
child be in utero no later than thirty-six months after parent's death); OHIO REV. CODE § 2105.14
(2013) (providing child be alive at parent's death to inherit).
90 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.104, 13.12.108 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2104,
14-2108 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-774, 45a-777 (2013); GA. CODE § 19-7-21 (2013);
HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 584-12, 560:2-108 (2013); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-104 (2013); IND. CODE §
29-1-2-6 (2013); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19-A, §§ 1561, 1562, & 1563 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 19013, § 2-114 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.30 (2013); MISS. CODE §§ 93-9-28,
91-1-27 (2013); MONT. CODE §§ 40-6-106, 40-6-113, 72-2-111, 72-2-113, 72-2-114, & 72-2-118
(2013); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-2308, 30-2303, 30-2304, 30-2309 (2013); NEv. REv. STAT. §
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large part to the contentious nature of the issue and the inability of state
legislatures to foresee the phenomenon of children being conceived after
the death of one or both biological parents. 91 A number of states address a
child of postmortem conception's inheritance rights; however, a specific
means of validating parentage is absent. 92 To be specific: Florida, Illinois,
Kansas, and Missouri
only address the inheritance rights of posthumously
93
conceived children.
Of approximately fifteen states with statutes governing the
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children for purposes of
intestate succession, at least four have been influenced by the Uniform
Probate Code. 94 This includes: Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, and
North Dakota.95 At least thirteen other states have been influenced by the
Uniform Probate Code in drafting and adopting statutes governing intestate
succession; however, these states have not yet adopted provisions
addressing posthumously conceived children.96

132.290 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. § 561:1 (2013); N.J. STAT. §§ 9:17-44, 3A:4-10 (2013); N.Y.
DOM. REL. § 73 (McKinney 2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2013);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-13 (2013); 10 OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§
109.243, 112.045, & 112.075 (2013); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 5103, 2101, & 2104 (2013); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-8, 33-1-4 (2013); S.C. CODE §§ 62-2-101, 62-2-103, & 62-2-108 (2013);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-2-114, 29A-2-101, 29A-2-103, & 29A-2-108 (2013); TENN. CODE
§§ 31-2-105, 31-2-104, & 31-2-108 (2013); VT. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 314, 315 (2013); WIS. STAT. §§
891.40, 852.01 (2013); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-501, 2-3-101, & 2-4-103 (2013).
91 See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S.Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012) ("The technology that made the twins'
conception and birth possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when the
relevant provisions of the Social Security Act (Act) originated (1939) or were amended to read as
they now do (1965).").
92 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 742.11, 742.17 (2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2, 40/3, &
5/2-3
(2013); KAN. STAT. §§ 23-2301, 23-2302, 23-2303, 59-501, & 59-506 (2013); MO. STAT. §§
210.824 & 210.836 (2013). As stated previously, there is little benefit to knowing what
inheritance rights are available to posthumously conceived children if there is no clear way to
ascertain who legally qualifies as the "child" of a decedent. See Felts supra, note 57 and
accompanying text (discussing issues involved in determining inheritance rights of posthumously
conceived children).
93 See supra note 92 (citing specific state inheritance statutes that fail to establish parentage
for posthumously conceived children).
94 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-104, 15-11-120(11) (2013) (permitting posthumously
conceived child to inherit under some circumstances); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120 (2014) (allowing
children of postmortem conception to inherit from deceased parent); N.M. STAT. § § 45-2-104, 452-120(K) (2014) (providing posthumously conceived child can inherit if in utero within specified
time post-death); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-04-04, 30.1-04-19(11) (2014) (permitting
posthumously conceived child to inherit under intestate succession if certain conditions are met).
95 See sources cited supra note 94 (stating deceased person is parent of child conceived
postmortem if consented in writing); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2013) (affirming
deceased is legal parent of posthumously conceived child if consented to assisted reproduction).
96 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.104, 13.12.108 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 142104, 14-2108 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-108 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-104
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Conversely, some states confront the legal parent-child relationship
between a posthumously conceived child and his or her deceased biological
parent(s) but avoid the issue of inheritance.9 7

For example, Alabama,

Delaware, Louisiana, Texas, Utah, and Washington only offer guidance for
verifying parentage. 98 Currently, the District of Columbia and ten states
are the only regions that provide a means of determining both the parentage
and inheritance rights of children conceived post-death. 99 States adopting
means of analyzing both include: California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky,

(2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, §§ 2-103, 2-108 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, §§ 2101, 2-108 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.30 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-111, 72-2113, 72-2-114, & 72-2-118 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2308, 30-2303, & 30-2304 (2013);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A, 3B (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-101, 62-2-103, & 62-2-108 (2013);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-2-101, 29A-2-103, & 29A-2-108 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 752-101, 75-2-103, & 75-2-104 (2014); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (2014). States that have
been influenced by the Uniform Probate Code but have not adopted provisions addressing the
inheritance rights of children of postmortem conception include: Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Utah. See sources cited supra.
97 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-707, 43-8-43, & 43-8-47 (2013); DEL. CODE
tit. 12, §§
501, 505 (2013); DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 8-707 (2013); LA. CIV. CODE art. 939 & 940 (2013); TEX.
FAM. CODE § 160.707 (2013); UTAH CODE §§ 78b-15-707, 75-2-101, 75-2-103, & 75-2-104
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.04.015, 26.26.730 (2013).
98 See supra note 97 (highlighting state statutes where determining inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children is difficult).
99 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 7613 (2013) (addressing parentage); CAL. PROB. CODE §
249.5 (2013) (addressing inheritance); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120 (2013) (indicating how to
establish parent-child relationship); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-104, 15-11-120(11) (2013)
(discussing inheritance of posthumously conceived children); D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(A) (2013)
(establishing means of proving parentage between deceased individual and child conceived after
deceased individual's death); D.C. CODE § 19-314 (2013) (stating inheritance rights of children
of postmortem conception); IOWA CODE § 600B (2013) (discussing parentage); IOWA CODE §
633.220A (2013) (offering posthumously conceived child's right to inherit under intestate
succession); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 406.021, 213.046 (2013) (determining parentage); KY. REV.
STAT. § 391.070 (2013) (addressing inheritance rights); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-205
(2013) (stating method of figuring out parent-child relationship); MD CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 3-107 (2013) (explaining posthumously conceived child's right to inherit under
intestate succession); MINN. STAT. §§ 524.2-103, 524.2-116, & 524.2-120 (2013) (exclaiming
parentage and inheritance of children of postmortem conception); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-120 (2013)
(adopting Uniform Parentage Act and declaring parent-child relationship between posthumously
conceived child and deceased parent(s)); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-104, 45-2-120(K) (2013)
(adopting Uniform Probate Code and indicating inheritance rights of child of postmortem
conception); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (2013) (adopting Uniform Parentage Act to
determine parental status of deceased individual); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-04-04 & 30.1-0419(11) (2013) (adopting Uniform Probate Code to provide method of establishing inheritance
rights under intestate succession); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111 (2013) (offering parent-child
relationship between posthumously conceived child and deceased parent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.14 (2013) (implying posthumously conceived child is not entitled to intestate succession
because no parent-child relationship exists); VA. CODE § 20-158(B) (2013) (stating method of
proving parentage); VA. CODE §§ 64.2-200, 64.2-204 (2013) (indicating inheritance rights).
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Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, and Virginia. 100
Of approximately seventeen states that have addressed the legal
parent-child relationship between a decedent and a child of postmortem
conception, at least ten have been influenced by the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA). 1 1 This includes: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington. 10 2 At
least eight other states have been influenced by the UPA; however, they
have not yet adopted
the Act's provisions on parentage of posthumously
10 3
conceived children.
b. Case Law
Considering most state legislatures have provided limited direction
for establishing the parentage and inheritance rights of posthumously
conceived children, the judiciary has played a significant role in the
interim. 104 In 1993, a California Court of Appeal decided a landmark case
representing a decedent's right to control the use of his or her reproductive
cells post-death. 10 5 Subsequently, two dominant approaches have emerged
100 See sources cited supra note 99.
101See sources cited supra note 99 (listing statutes addressing parentage and inheritance); see
also ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2013); CAL. PROB. CODE § 7613 (Deering 2013); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-4-106 (2013); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8-707 (2013); N.M. STAT. § 40-11A-707 (2013);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700 (2013); TEx. FAM. CODE §
160.707 (2013); UTAH CODE § 78B-15-707 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.730 (2013);
Medford, supra note 53, at 105 (noting several state legislatures have modeled intestacy laws
after UPA as ART becomes commonplace).
102 See sources cited supra note 101 (listing statutes modeled after UPA).
103 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 584-12 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 1561, 1562, &
1563 (2013); MISS. CODE § 93-9-28 (2013); MO. STAT. §§ 210.824, 210.836 (2013); MONT.
CODE §§ 40-6-106, 40-6-113 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. § 561:1 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
33-1-4 (2013); Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-4-101, 2-4-103 (2013). States that have been influenced by the
Uniform Parentage Act but have yet to adopt provisions regarding posthumously conceived
children include: Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Wyoming. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 584-12 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 1561,
1562, & 1563 (2013); MISS. CODE § 93-9-28 (2013); MO. STAT. §§ 210.824, 210.836 (2013);
MONT. CODE §§ 40-6-106, 40-6-113 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. § 561:1 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 33-1-4 (2013); Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-4-101, 2-4-103 (2013). Missouri addresses the
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children; however, no other state previously
mentioned addresses posthumously conceived children in the context of inheritance either. Cf
MO. STAT. §§ 210.824, 210.836 (2013).
104 See supra Part III.A.ii.
1 (outlining inadequacy of current statutory law); Felts, supra note
10, at 262 (considering inheritance issues innate with posthumous conception); Lewis, supra note
42, at 494 (identifying parentage tests developed through case law).
105See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 287-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
decedent had property interest in his sperm). While Hecht is not binding precedent outside of
California, this case has been highly persuasive in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cornelio v.
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in determining a posthumously conceived child's right to inherit from a
deceased parent: (1) A broader approach based on the decedent's intent;
and (2) A narrower approach that hinges on the language of the intestacy
statute in question.0 6
i. Right to Regulate Reproductive Cells After Death:
Hecht v. Superior Court
In Hecht v. Superior Court, William E. Kane had fifteen
vials of his sperm
cryopreserved and signed an agreement with the sperm

bank, which stated in pertinent part:
In the event of the death of the client [William E. Kane],
the client instructs the Cryobank to: .

.

. [ ] Continue to

store [the specimens] upon request of the executor of the
estate [or] [r]elease the specimens to the executor of the
estate.' A provision captioned 'Authorization to Release
Specimens' states, 'I, William Everett Kane, . . . authorize
the [sperm bank] to release my semen specimens (vials) to
Deborah Ellen Hecht. I am also authorizing specimens0 to
7
be released to recipient's physician Dr. Kathryn Moyer.1
Deborah Hecht was Kane's live-in girlfriend and when he died
they had been together for approximately five years.l18
On October 30, 1991 -approximately one month after he had his
sperm cryopreserved-William Kane committed suicide in a Las Vegas
Hotel. 10 9 Kane died testate, and indicated in his will:
I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any
specimens of my
sperm stored at any sperm bank or similar facility

Stamford Hosp., No. CV 960155779S, 1997 WL 430619, at *5 n.4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21,
1997) (noting Hecht determined "proprietary rights to sperm"); Kurchner v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d. 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("Cases from other jurisdictions hold
that preserved sperm or eggs constitute personal property."); Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992,
2005 WL 4694579, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005) ("Cases from other jurisdictions have
recognized the existence of a property right in materials derived from the human body.") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 261 n.9 (Mass.
2002) (acknowledging Hecht addressed whether sperm was "property that could be bequeathed")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
106 See Lewis, supra note 42, at 497-99 (describing various courts diverse positions in
interpreting statutory law).
107 Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
108 Id. (explaining relationship between plaintiff and decedent).
109 See id.
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for storage to Deborah Ellen

Hecht .

.

.

It being my intention that

samples of my sperm will be stored at a sperm bank for the use of Deborah
Ellen Hecht, should she so desire ... 110 Accordingly, Hecht attempted to
obtain Kane's cryopreserved sperm but met resistance from Kane's
surviving children from a former marriage.Iii
In opposition to Hecht's use of the cryopreserved sperm, Kane's
surviving children initially argued that destroying the sperm would guard a
traditional family unit-like theirs-in two distinct ways. 112 First, it would
prevent the birth of a child who would never know his or her father and, in
essence, never experience a traditional upbringing." 3 Second, the sperm's
disposal would thwart any disruption traditional families14 may experience,
including psychological, emotional, and financial stress. 1
Ultimately, the court acknowledged the value of sperm because of
its potential to create human life and concluded that Kane maintained an
ownership interest in the use of his sperm for reproductive purposes postdeath. 115 A factor that substantially influenced the court's decision was
Kane's explicit intent for Hecht to use his sperm, which was manifested in
his will. 116 Finally, the court noted the absence
of any public policy or
117
improper.
was
decision
its
statute indicating
ii. Broader Approach
Landmark cases adopting a broader approach in determining the
inheritance rights of children of postmortem conception have been decided
in states like Massachusetts and New Jersey.""S For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) decided Woodward v.

110 Id. at 276-77.

See Felts, supra note 10, at 263 (expounding how issue in Hecht developed).
See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286 (describing arguments proffered by decedent's children
in opposition to plaintiff s use of cryopreserved sperm).
113 Id. (outlining argument opposing posthumous conception).
114 Id. at 290 (describing argument against posthumous conception).
115 Id. at 283. The court based its decision on California's Probate Code section 62, which
112

defined property as "anything that may be the subject of ownership and includes both real and
personal property and any interest therein." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 See id. at 283-84 (delineating significance of will in proving decedent's intent).
117 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283-84, 289-90 (addressing possible counterargument to
court's holding).
118 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259 (allowing children of postmortem conception to
inherit if certain conditions are met); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2000) (emphasizing New Jersey legislature's general intent to amply provide for
surviving children of deceased parents).
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Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. in 2002.119 In Woodward, Lauren and Warren
Woodward-a married couple-arranged to have Warren's sperm
cryopreserved for future use after he was diagnosed with leukemia in
1993.120 Several months later, Warren Woodward succumbed to his
illness. 12 1 In 1995, Lauren
Woodward gave birth to twins conceived using
22
Warren's frozen sperm.1
Subsequently, Lauren Woodward applied for social security
benefits but was denied because the SSA determined she had not
1 23
established her twins were Warren's "children" as defined by the Act.
After a series of appeals, Woodward reached the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts and the assigned judge certified the
question to the Massachusetts SJC. 1 24 This is because it was an issue of
first impression in the state and determination of the twins' inheritance
rights under Massachusetts intestacy law was dispositive of the case .125
Woodward's primary argument was that posthumously conceived
children-like her twins-must always be allowed to enjoy the advantages
of intestate succession by virtue of their genetic connection to the
decedent. 126 The SSA's principal argument was because children of
postmortem conception are not "in being" at the time of the decedent's
death, they can never qualify as "children" for purposes of intestate
succession. 127 However, the SIC refused to establish any bright-line rules
absent some statutory requirement. 12 Therefore, neither party's argument
was tenable. 129 Ultimately, the court decided:
In certain limited circumstances, a child resulting from
posthumous reproduction may enjoy the inheritance rights

119
120

Woodward v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259. (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 260. The Woodward's had only been married for three and one-half years and were

childless when the decedent was diagnosed with cancer. Id. Doctors advised the Woodward's
that Warren may become sterile from the cancer treatments. Id.
121 Id. (describing facts leading up to birth of posthumously conceived children in question).
122 Id. at 260.
123 Id. at 261 (elaborating on why plaintiff s claim for benefits was denied).
124 Id. at 261 (explaining procedural history).
125 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 257 (elucidating how important state law was to ascertain
eligibility for Social Security benefits). This was the first case in the United States to ever reach a
court of last resort regarding a posthumously conceived child's right to inherit under intestate
succession. Id.
126 Id. at 262 (articulating arguments presented by each party).
127 Id. (reiterating Social Security Administration's position).
128 See id. (rejecting arguments in favor of establishing bright-line rules when not required by
Massachusetts intestacy statute).
129 See id. (disagreeing with arguments presented).
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of 'issue' under the Massachusetts intestacy statute. These
limited circumstances exist where, as a threshold matter,
the surviving parent or the child's other legal
representative demonstrates a genetic relationship between
the child and the decedent. The survivor or representative
must then establish that the decedent affirmatively
consented to posthumous conception and to the support of
any resulting child. Even where such circumstances exist,
time limitations may preclude commencing a claim for
succession rights on behalf of a posthumously conceived
child. 30
Another case of first impression was In re Estate of Kolacy decided
by the New Jersey Superior Court in 2000.11 In that case, William J.
Kolacy was diagnosed with leukemia in 1994 and advised to undergo
chemotherapy immediately. 3 2 Consequently, William and his wife,
Mariantonia Kolacy, froze William's sperm to preserve his ability to
33
procreate in the future.'
One year later, at the age of twenty six, William
34
Kolacy passed away.1
In November 1996, Mariantonia Kolacy gave birth to twins
conceived using William's cryopreserved sperm. 3 5 Kolacy later applied
for social security benefits but her application was denied. 3 6 The SSA
reasoned the twins were not "children" of William Kolacy, the deceased
wage earner. 3 7 Whereas the twins were eligible for social security benefits
if they could inherit under New Jersey intestacy law, Kolacy sought a
declaration her twins qualified under intestate succession in the New Jersey
Superior Court. 38

130

Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259.

Only the issue of whether posthumously conceived

children could theoretically inherit from a deceased parent under Massachusetts intestacy law was
certified to the SJC. See id. at 259-60 (clarifying SJC did not decide facts of case). Accordingly,
the SJC's conclusion was decided in the abstract, and not based on the specific facts presented in
Woodward. Id
131 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (confronting
whether posthumously conceived children were entitled to inherit under intestate succession).
132 Id. (discussing facts).
133 Id.
134 Id. (providing William Kolacy succumbed to leukemia on April 15, 1995).
135 Id. (stating twins were born approximately eighteen months after decedent's passing).
136 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259 (recalling procedural history).
137 Id. (reviewing why Social Security Administration denied plaintiff's request forbenefits).
131 Id. at 1259 (indicating New Jersey intestacy law was dispositive of case). Plaintiff was
still exercising her appellate rights within the Social Security Administration when she brought
the issue to the New Jersey Superior Court. Id. (citing procedural history).
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Kolacy's principal argument was New Jersey's intestacy statute
was unconstitutional because" .. [its] ...effect ...[on]... posthumously
conceived children . . . [was] . . . both invidiously and irrationally
discriminate
,139
However, the court found Kolacy's argument
misplaced, and declined to entertain the issue further. 140
The court
acknowledged a practical and legal need to quickly ascertain who can take
a decedent's estate and expediently distribute the property they are entitled
to.141 Therefore, heirs at law have
historically been determined as of the
142
passing.
decedent's
the
date of
The SSA's primary argument was the court should not consider
actions dealing with the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived
children without specific direction from the New Jersey Legislature .143
While the court recognized the desirability of clear legislative guidance, it
noted simple justice demands the court work with present legislation as
best it can. 4 4 This is because individuals seeking judicial redress have
present problems that cannot afford to be put on hold until the Legislature
chooses to act. 145 Moreover, the court observed the Legislature's general
46
intent for children of a deceased individual to be sufficiently supported.1
Ergo, the court said "general intent should prevail over a
restrictive, literal reading of statutes which did not consciously purport to
"'147
deal with the kind of problem before us.
The court expounded, once it
is established a child is the offspring of a decedent, that child should
benefit as an heir at law. 148 The only exception would be if doing so would
unfairly encroach on the rights of others or create serious issues concerning
the orderly administration of an estate. 149
139 Id. at 1260 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

(outlining arguments

presented). The language of the New Jersey statute in question said: "Relatives of the decedent
conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of
the decedent." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2013).
140 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1260 (rejecting plaintiff s equal protection argument).
141 See id. (implying posthumously conceived children create complicated inheritance
issues).

142 Id. at 1261 (indicating ability of posthumously conceived children to inherit under
intestate succession frustrates tradition).

143
144

Id.(examining merits of SSA's argument against awarding twins benefits).
Id. at 1261-62 (justifying decision despite no clear-cut guidance from New Jersey

Legislature).
145In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261-62 (announcing why court could not wait for

direction from New Jersey Legislature).
146 Id. (elucidating legislative intent).
147Id.(articulating broad approach adopted by court).
148Id.(recognizing circumstances under which posthumously conceived children can inherit

under intestate succession).
149 Id. (recognizing interest in expedient administration of estates).
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iii. Narrower Approach
States that have adopted a more conservative approach in dealing
with the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children include
Arkansas and Iowa. 150 In 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided
Finley v. Astrue. 151 In that case, Amy and Michael Finley underwent
fertility treatments to aid in conceiving a child. 152 In June 2001-using
Amy's eggs and Michael Finley's sperm-doctors facilitated the creation
of several embryos. 1 53 Two embyros were implanted in Amy Finley's
uterus and four were cryopreserved. 154 Mrs. Finley become pregnant but
later suffered a miscarriage. 5556 In July 2001, Michael Finley died intestate
while domiciled in Arkansas. 1
Less than one year after Michael Finley died, Amy conceived a
child with his cryopreserved sperm. 157 Afterward, Amy Finley applied for
social security benefits but her claim was denied. 15 Finley exhausted her
appeals at the administrative level and sought relief in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 159 The District Court
certified the question of whether a posthumously conceived child could
inherit under Arkansas intestacy law to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.160
Finley first argued her child was medically "conceived" during the
decedent's life when her eggs were fertilized by her husband's sperm. 161
Furthermore, she argued there was no Arkansas statute prohibiting a natural
child conceived post-death from inheriting from his or her deceased
parent. 162 Lastly, Finley argued all children's rights-including rights to
property and inheritance-warrant protection as a matter of public

150

See Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Ark. 2008) (stating standard rule of statutory

construction is to heed legislative intent); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2011)
(providing Iowa's statutory language was clear on its face).
151 Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849.
152 Id. at 850 (detailing factual history of case).
153 Id. (evaluating where cryopreserved embryos came from).
154 Id. (describing how Amy Finley conceived posthumously).
155 Id. (exhibiting how assisted reproduction is not always successful).
156 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850 (summarizing facts).
157 Id. at 851 (summarizing facts).
158 Id. (articulating primary cause of dispute).
159 See id at 850 (expounding procedural history).
160 Id. (highlighting importance of applying appropriate state law).
161 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851 (relaying plaintiff's assertion her child was posthumously born
and not posthumously conceived); see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (noting
significance of being posthumously born rather than posthumously conceived under intestate
succession).
162 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851 (citing arguments presented to court).
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policy.

163

The SSA's primary argument was that Arkansas law did not
explicitly authorize posthumously conceived children to inherit from a
deceased parent. 164
Additionally, the SSA contended that intestate
succession warrants finality. 165 Hence, "conceived" for purposes of
inheritance meant the onset of pregnancy. 166 This is because it was highly
improbable the Arkansas General Assembly would have defined
1
"conception" as broadly as Finley purported in light of its objective. 67
Finally, the SSA alleged public
policy was not a matter for the courts, but
1
rather the General Assembly. 68
The applicable Arkansas statute provided in pertinent part:
"Posthumous descendants of the intestate conceived before his or her death

but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as if born in the
lifetime of the intestate.,, 169 The court referenced the basic rule of statutory
construction: giving effect to the legislature's goal by assigning express
words their ordinary meaning. 170 Hence, the court concluded:
[T]he statutory scheme fails to define the term 'conceived'
...[,however,]

...we find there is no need to do so, as we
can definitively say that the General Assembly ...did not

intend for the statute to permit a child, created through in
vitro fertilization and implanted after the father's death, to
inherit under intestate succession. Not only does the
instant statute fail to specifically address such a scenario,
but it was enacted in 1969, which was well before
the
171
developed.
was
fertilization
vitro
in
of
technology
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
interpreted Iowa intestacy law as proscribing a posthumously conceived
child's ability to inherit under intestate succession. 172 In that case, Bruce
163
164

Id. (outlining Finley's arguments).
See id. (reiterating Social Security Administration's rationale for declining to award

plaintiff's child social security benefits).
165 See id.; see also In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 30,
2000) (acknowledging practical need for probate to be quick and final).
166 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 851.
167 Id. (recalling Social Security Administration's position).
168 Id. (recounting SSA's position).
169 Id. at 853 (internal quotations omitted) (delving into analysis).
170 Id. (exploring court's rationale).
171 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853 (answering district court's certified question regarding
inheritance rights of children of postmortem conception).
172 Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011) (adopting narrow approach).
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and Patti Beeler were an engaged coupled who planned to marry in May
2001.173 Before their wedding, Bruce was diagnosed with acute leukemia
and advised to undergo chemotherapy. 174 The couple wanted to have75
children someday, but the cancer treatments posed a risk of infertility.1
Bruce's diagnosis was poor; so the Beelers rescheduled their wedding and
married in December 2000.176
Aware of his impending death, Bruce Beeler signed a form that
explained Patti Beeler was the only person who could use his sperm if he
died. 177 Notably, the form also stated Bruce acknowledged paternity and
child support obligations of any child or children resulting from the use of
his cryopreserved
sperm. 78 In May 2001, at the age of thirty seven, Bruce
179
Beeler died.
Patti and Bruce Beeler's mother alleged Bruce was comforted in
his final days by his belief Patti would have his children when he was
gone. 8 0 In April 2003, Patti gave birth to a daughter conceived using
Bruce's frozen sperm.' 8' Subsequently, Beeler applied for social security
benefits and was rejected. 82 The SSA concluded Beeler's child was not
Bruce's "child" under the Social Security Act. 83 Beeler appealed the
SSA's decision8until
she reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
4
Eighth Circuit. 1
Beeler's argument was § 416(h)-portion of Act deferring to state
intestacy law-contains "savings clauses" that permit a claimant who does
not meet the definition of "child" under § 416(e)-portion of Act defining
"child"-to nonetheless qualify as a "child" for purposes of social security
benefits. 18 5 Under this reading of the Act, a claimant child who is the

173

Id. (laying out facts of case).

Id.
171See id. Therefore, the Beelers elected to have Bruce's sperm cryopreserved for future
174

use. Id.
176 See id.(revealing bone marrow transplant would be decedent's only chance of survival).
177 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956 (indicating decedent signed hospital's Form 61 bequeathing
cryopreserved sperm to wife).
178 Id. at 957 (illustrating decedent's intent).
179 Id. (summarizing what led to child being conceived posthumously)
180 Id. (implying it was decedent's intent to have and provide for any children posthumously
conceived).
181Id. (exploring facts of case).
182 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957 (explaining how case reached Eighth Circuit).
183 Id. at 957 (exemplifying SSA's reason for declining to award plaintiffs child any social

security benefits).
184 Id. (elucidating case history).
185

Id. at 959. Subsequently, inAstrue v. Capato, the United States Supreme Court expressly

rejected Beeler's argument. See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012) (asserting §
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biological offspring of an insured decedent is a "child" within the meaning
of § 416(e) and reference to § 416(h) is unnecessary. 186 However, the SSA
maintained that § 416(h) was the 18sole
manner by which a claimant could
7
qualify as a "child" under the Act.

In determining a posthumously conceived child's inheritance rights
under Iowa law, the court ultimately adopted the SSA's statutory
construction.' 88 The Iowa statute relied on by the court declared that for a
child to be an heir at law under intestate succession, he or she must have
had a relationship with the decedent at the time of death. 18 9 Posthumously
born children were the only exception. 190 The court concluded because
Beeler's child was not conceived until after Bruce died, she did not have
the requisite "relationship" required under the statute.191
Beeler argued her child qualified under an alternative Iowa statute
that permitted biological children to inherit from a deceased parent if
paternity of the child was acknowledged by the decedent. 192 The court said
Bruce Beeler did not acknowledge the child before his death because she
did not exist when he died; to conclude otherwise would stretch the
language of the statute too far. 193
Beeler further alleged her daughter was nonetheless a "child" under
§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), which deemed a child the natural offspring of a
194
decedent if the deceased parent recognized the child as such in writing.
The court stated the hospital form did not meet the requirements because
the language indicated Bruce Beeler agreed to recognize paternity at some
point in the future. 195 Despite Bruce's intentions, "the statute's use of the
definite article-requiring an 'acknowledge[ment] in writing that the
applicant is his .. . son or daughter'-indicates . . .the insured must

416(h) is supplementary to and not exclusive from § 416(e)).
186 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959 (exploring plaintiff's arguments).
187 See id.(providing SSA's interpretation of "child" under Act as basis for its denial of

survivor benefits).

188See id. at 964 (describing courts evaluation of issue).
189Id. at 959 (discussing relationship requirement).
190 Id. The Iowa statute relied on by the court in Beeler v. Astrue explained:

Heirs of an intestate, begotten before the intestate's death but born thereafter, shall
inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived the
intestate. With this exception, the intestate succession shall be determined by the
relationships existing at the time of the death of the intestate.
IOWA CODE § 633.220 (2013).
191
192

Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964 (reading statutory language literally).
Id. (delineating plaintiff's argument)

193 Id. at 965.
194
195

Id. at 964.
Id. (declining to adopt plaintiff's interpretation of statute).
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acknowledge a particular child .

.

. for that child to be deemed a natural

child.', 196 Hence, the provision
was held not to apply to children conceived
197
after the death of a decedent.
c. Determining What State Law Applies
Under the Social Security Act, receipt of benefits depends on the
intestacy law of
198
the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of death.
Established in Gordon v. Steele, the most commonly used standard used for
determining an individual's domicile hinges on his or her intent to remain
indefinitely. 199
For a person to reside somewhere indefinitely does not mean there
is an intent to reside in a new state permanently.20 0 On the other hand,
going to a state to visit is not enough to satisfy the requisite intent for
establishing a domiciliary under this test either.20 ' Most often, courts
define "indefinitely" as residing in a place with no present intention of
moving somewhere else in the future.20 2
Courts have frequently purported an individual does not lose his or
her domicile by merely moving to a new residence. 20 3 The general rule is a
person does not lose his or her domicile until acquiring a new one. 20 4 In
essence, a person does not lose his or her domicile until he or she moves to
a new state with an intent to reside indefinitely. 205
196 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964 (citation omitted).
197

Id. (drawing line at posthumously conceived children).

198 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2013).

199 See Gordon v. Steele, 376 F. Supp. 575, 577-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (outlining relevant
factors suggestive of someone's intent to remain indefinitely); see also JOSEPH W. GLANNON,
ANDREW M. PERLMAN, & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 45

(2011) (summarizing test for determining domicile).
200 See Gordon, 376 F. Supp. at 578 (indicating permanent intent is not required); GLANNON
ET AL., supra note 199, at 47 (defining "indefinitely").
201 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., § 3613 THE REQUIREMENT AND MEANING OF
CITIZENSHIP ACQUISITION OF A NEW DOMICILE, 13E FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3613 (3rd
ed. 2014) (acknowledging Gordon test is two-pronged).
202 See BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE ET AL., § 1:88. ELEMENTS OF DOMICILE-INTENTION TO
REMAIN INDEFINITELY, 1 FED. PROC. L. ED. § 1:88 (2014); Wright, supra note 200.
203 See GLANNON ET AL., supra note 199, at 45 (describing process of losing and gaining
domicile).
204 Id. (discussing indefinite versus permanent tests for domicile).
205 See Gordon, 376 F. Supp. at 577-78 (providing residency must be coupled with requisite
intent); GLANNON ET AL., supra note 199, at 45 (reiterating test is not merely residence). For
example, an individual who resides in Massachusetts for college but plans to return to her home
state of California after graduation is a domiciliary of California (assuming it was student's
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Although courts generally apply the Gordon test, some
jurisdictions apply alternative tests. 20 6 To be specific, some courts provide
a person is domiciled where he or she resides with an intent to remain for

the time at least.20 7

This test is distinct from the "intent to remain

indefinitely" test because, in essence, proof of residency alone would likely
satisfy this standard. 20 8 Furthermore, some courts also use an "intent to
remain permanently" test. 20 9 For example, in Mas v. Perry, the court stated
that, "a person's domicile is the place of his true, fixed, and permanent
home and principal establishment, and to' 2which
he has the intention of
1
returning whenever he is absent therefrom. , 0
IV ANALYSIS
Based on precedent to date, it is clear that in states not expressly
granting inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children, the law
must be sufficiently ambiguous to allow such an interpretation. 2i If that is
the case, there are numerous things that should be considered to enhance
the ability to reproduce posthumously and to secure inheritance rights for
any resulting children.2 " Initially, prospective parents should consider
getting married to ensure posthumous conception is not precluded on
illegitimacy grounds.2i 3 Next, prospective parents should consider the
following to substantiate inheritance rights: Executing a will; Minimizing

domicile before moving to Massachusetts), despite residing in Massachusetts. See GLANNON ET
supra note 199, at 47 (exemplifying domicile). To the contrary, if the college student moved
to Massachusetts with no intent to move back to California or to any other location, the student
would become a domiciliary of Massachusetts. See GLANNON ET AL., supra note 199
(exemplifying domicile). This would be true even if the student subsequently changed her mind
and decided to move back to California after graduation. See GLANNON ET AL., supra note 199,
at 45-47 (expounding meaning of domicile). The student would not become a domiciliary of
California again until she moved back with an intent to remain there with no present intent of
leaving in the future. See GLANNON ET AL., supra note 199 (exemplifying domicile).
AL.,

See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (using intent to remain
permanently test).
207 See Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 1980) ("To establish a domicile
of
choice a person generally must be physically present at the location and intend to make that place
his home for the time at least.").
208 See GLANNON ET AL., supra note 199, at 47-48 (illustrating "intent to remain for the time
206

at least" test).
209 See Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399 (applying "intent to remain permanently" test).
210 Id. (quoting Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
211 See supra Part III.A.ii.2 (discussing case law on inheritance rights of posthumously
conceived children).
212 See rnfra Part IV.A-E.
213 See rnfra Part IV.A (offering method to avoid illegitimacy claims).
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time between death and conception; and Utilizing the ambiguity of
domicile.214 Moreover, emphasizing a legislature's past reliance on model
acts like the Uniform Probate Code and/or Uniform Parentage Act may
persuade a court to adopt law modeled after such acts in the interim.215
For prospective parents of posthumously conceived children,
marriage may preclude illegitimacy arguments by opposing parties and
enhance the likelihood of permissible posthumous conception. 216 In Hecht,
for example, the defendants argued the decedent's sperm should not be
released to the plaintiff for procreative purposes because she was never
married to the decedent. 217 Before rejecting that argument, the California
court tested its credence. 218
The primary reason the court disclaimed the defendants'
illegitimacy argument was because the relevant California statute
governing artificial insemination excluded the word "married," which
meant the statute applied to all women.2 19 More specifically, the court said
"[H]ad the Legislature intended to express a pubic policy concern against
procreative rights of unmarried women, it would not have excluded the
word "married" from . . . [the statute].

'

,220

Without pertinent authority

suggesting California public policy was to prohibit an unmarried woman
from utilizing assisted reproductive technology to procreate, the court
refused to ban the release of the decedent's sperm.221
Although there is no public policy in California against unmarried
women procreating, the same may not be true in other states. 22222 Cases
involving posthumously conceived children are consistently non-uniform
and complex. 223 Therefore, prospective parents should make every effort to
avoid complications that may arise from potential illegitimacy arguments
and marry as soon as possible.224
Whereas a decedent's intent is a huge factor for consideration
214
215
216

See infra Part IV.B-D.
See infra Part IV.E (assessing how reliance on UPA and/or UPC may be persuasive).
See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting

illegitimacy argument made in opposition to plaintiff's request for deceased boyfriend's
cryopreserved sperm).
217 See id. at 276, 286 (exclaiming plaintiff was decedent's girlfriend-not wife).
218 See id. at 284-86 (analyzing different case that addressed similar issue).
219 See id.
221 Id. at 286.
221 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287 (rejecting illegitimacy argument).
222 Cf id. at 287 (finding no public policy prohibiting unmarried women from using ART in
California).
223 See supra Part III.A.ii.2 (discussing wide discrepancies among states in dealing with
posthumously conceived children).
224 See supra Part III.A.ii.2.a (summarizing Hecht).
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regarding the parentage and inheritance rights of posthumously conceived
children, executing a will is one way to make intent clear.225 Though Hecht
involved the right to control the use of reproductive material for
procreation post-death, the facts of that case indicate what a court may
*
22
2
consider in ascertaining a decedent's intent.
26 The decedent in Hecht, for
example, went to great lengths to make his intent for the plaintiff to use his
sperm for posthumous conception clear, which was largely determinative
of the court's decision in that case.227 Not only did the decedent deposit
fifteen vials of his sperm in a bank the month he died, he filed a letter of
intent with the sperm bank, as well. 228 Likewise, the decedent made a will
229
that clearly expressed his intended use for the cryopreserved sperm.
Largely based on his will, the court concluded the decedent's intent was to
230
have his sperm released to the plaintiff for procreative purposes.
Therefore, the court followed his wishes.23i
Additionally, the Massachusetts court in Woodward determined for
a posthumously conceived child to inherit from a deceased parent, the
decedent's intent to procreate posthumously must be established; an intent
to provide for any resulting children must be evidenced, as well. 232 By
having a will, a plaintiff can better establish a decedent's intent to have and
provide for posthumously conceived children.233
This, in turn, will
increase the likelihood of securing inheritance benefits, particularly in
those jurisdictions that have adopted a broader approach in determining the
inheritance rights of posthumously children.234
Another factor that will likely enhance a posthumously conceived
child's right to inheritance is expedient conception after the deceased
parent's death.235 Most, if not all states that expressly address the issue

225 See supra Part III.A.ii.2.b (discussing cases that focus on decedent's intent in determining
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children).
226 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (identifying issue in Hecht).
227 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)

(elucidating decedent's will was persuasive).
228 See id. (relating steps decedent took to make intent clear).
229 See id. (citing exact language of decedent's will).
230 See id.
231 See id. (noting court's holding).
232 See Woodward v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (Mass. 2002).
233 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 283-84 (exhibiting influence wills can have on ascertaining
decedent's intent).
234 See supra Part III.A.ii.2.b (discussing broad approach adopted by some courts and factors
they consider when determining inheritance rights).
235 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (establishing when posthumously conceived
children must be in gestation to qualify under intestate succession); see also Woodward, 760
N.E.2d at 259-60 (indicating time restrictions may preclude inheritance rights).
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require a posthumously conceived child be in gestation within a specific
time post-death to qualify under intestate succession. 23 6 There is, however,

great disparity among the states regarding the statutory time period.237 To
be specific, statutes mandate a child be in utero anywhere from ten months
to three years after the deceased parent's death.238 If a child is not in
gestation within the requisite period, it will serve as an absolute bar to a
child's inheritance rights under both intestate succession and for social
23 9
security purposes.
Ergo, it is imperative to know what, if any, time bar
240
applies.

Even in states with no statutes specifically governing the
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, courts have
recognized the importance of timely distribution of a decedent's estate, as
well. 241 For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
suggested time limitations may impede a child's ability to inherit from a
deceased biological parent.242 Additionally, the Superior Court of New
243
Jersey also noted the significance of timely conception post-death.
Specifically, the court indicated there is a practical and legal need to timely
ascertain who is entitled to inherit from a decedent's estate and quickly
administer property to entitled heirs.244

Accordingly, the sooner a child is conceived after a deceased
parent's death, the greater the chance of successfully procuring inheritance
rights under state intestacy law and the Social Security Act. 245 There is

little room for persuasion in cases where a child is conceived after a
statutorily mandated period, however case law is less exact as to when

236

See sources cited supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing statutes requiring

posthumously conceived children be conceived within specific time frame).
237 See sources cited supra note 89 and accompanying text (illustrating varying time
periods).
238 See sources cited supra note 89 and accompanying text (citing various statutes expressly
addressing inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children); see also supra Part III.A.ii.2b
(analyzing cases where court mentioned importance of distributing estates as soon as possible).
239 See sources cited supra note 89 and accompanying text (identifying time bars); see also
supra Part III.A.i (clarifying how children of postmortem conception qualify to receive
security benefits).
240 See sources cited supra note 89 (noting divergent time bars in different
jurisdictions); see also supra Part III.A.i (same).
241 See Woodward v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (Mass.
(insinuating expedient distribution of estates may be desirable under some circumstances).
242 See id. (listing time limitations).
243 See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.

social
state
2002)

2000)

(acknowledging practical need to timely administer estates).
244 See id.
245 See supra Part III.A. (explicating statutes and case law governing inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children).
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conception must occur where state intestacy law fails to provide for such.246
Nonetheless, conceiving a child with the assistance of reproductive
*247
i
technology may be time consuming and uncertain.
Thus, it is best to
248
plan ahead for any difficulties that may arise.
Considering state intestacy law is dispositive of a posthumously
conceived child's receipt of social security benefits, it is critical to
demonstrate the decedent's domicile was in a state favorable to
posthumously conceived children.249 In terms of statutory law, children of
postmortem conception must be expressly permitted to inherit from a
deceased biological parent or the relevant statute must be sufficiently vague
to permit such a reading.250 In states where case law governs, it is critical
to establish domicile in a state that applies a broader approach. 25'
The best way to establish domicile in a favorable state is to find a
jurisdiction that applies a test based on the decedent's intent to remain in a
state for the time at least.252 This way, it need only be proved that the
decedent was staying in a state with the intent to be there at the time of his
or death.253 If the decedent was vacationing in California, for example, it is
possible to argue the decedent was a resident of California at the time of
death because (s)he was staying there with the intent to remain for the time
being.254 Consequently, California law would determine whether the
posthumously conceived child in question was entitled to inherit under
intestate succession, and in turn, entitled to receive social security
benefits.2 55 This would be true even if the decedent never intended to
remain in California indefinitely. 256 While determining domicile based on
an intent to remain for the time at least is a minority test, there are courts
that will accept that approach.257

246
247
248
249

See
See
See
See

supra Part III.A (comparing treatment of statutory time limits to case law).
supra Part II.A (introducing methods of ART).
supra Part II.A (explaining in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination).
supra Part III.A.i (discussing dependent relationship between social security benefits

and inheritance rights under intestate succession).
250 See supra Part III.A.ii.1-2 (analyzing broad and narrow approaches adopted by courts).
251 Compare supra Part III.A.ii.2.b (applying broad approach, which primarily focuses on
decedent's intent), with supra Part III.A.ii.2.c (employing narrow approach which concentrates
on legislative intent).
252

See Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 1980) (recognizing alternative test for

establishing domicile).
253

See id. (explaining "intent to remain for the time at least" test).

254 See id. (stating "intent to remain for time at least" test).
255 See supra Part III.A.i (disclosing requisites for posthumously conceived children to
receive social security benefits).

256 See Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1180 (discussing domicile).
257

See id. (referring to application of "intent to remain for time at least" test).
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Alternatively, trying to establish domicile in a jurisdiction using
the "intent to remain permanently" standard could prove difficult where
domicile is questionable. 258 To be specific, consider a claimant who wants
to establish the decedent's domicile in Massachusetts. 259 The decedent
lived in Massachusetts with no intention of returning to his or her home
state of New Hampshire; however, New Hampshire is a place the decedent
always returned to whenever absent therefrom.260
If Massachusetts
employed the intent to remain permanently test, a court would probably
find the decedent's domicile was in New Hampshire and New Hampshire
intestacy law would apply. 261 Notwithstanding, an intent to remain
permanently test is also
a minority approach, thus, difficulties arising from
262
this test are unlikely.

The majority test for establishing domicile is the intent to remain
indefinitely approach, which is less flexible than the intent to remain for the
time at least test, but more accommodating than the intent to remain
permanently test.263 To show domicile under this test, an individual must
exhibit a decedent was living in a particular state with no intention of
leaving at the time of death.264 Factors a court may consider in making
such a determination may include: billing address; driver's license; car
registration; location of employment, assets, and family; and anything else
that would suggest the decedent was residing in a state with the intent to
remain indefinitely. 265 Under this test, a persuasive advocate may
successfully argue a decedent's domicile is in a state favorable to
posthumously conceived children, even if domicile in that state is
questionable .266

Ultimately, establishing a decedent's domicile in a state with laws
favorable to children of postmortem conception is critical to ensure
inheritance rights under both intestate succession and the Social Security
Act. 2 67 While forum shopping is discouraged by courts, some states strictly
258

See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (reviewing different tests for domicile employed by different

jurisdictions).
259
260

See Woodward v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. 760 N.E.2d 257, 258-69 (Mass. 2002).
See supra Part lII.A.i.-2 (discussing law governing inheritance rights of posthumously

conceived children).
261 See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (instructing different ways to establish domicile); see also supra
Part III.A.i (reflecting on requirements under Social Security Act).
262 See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (analyzing domicile tests).
263 See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (comparing different tests for domicile).
264 See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (assessing majority approach for establishing domicile).
265 See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (touching on tests for domicile).
266 See supra Part III.A.ii.3 (exemplifying ambiguity of domicile).
267 See supra Part III.A.i (assessing how to qualify for social security benefits); see also
supra Part IIIA.ii (appraising relevant statutes and case law).
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proscribe posthumously conceived children from inheriting under intestate
succession, which means any right to social security benefits is also
extinguished. 268 Therefore, forum shopping may be the only way to269carry
out a decedent's intent to provide for his or her child(ren) post-death.
Emphasizing a state's past reliance on the Uniform Parentage Act
and/or the Uniform Probate Code may persuade a court to adopt rules
mirrored after them until the legislature expressly takes action. 270 To be
specific, states that have been influenced by the Uniform Parentage Act in
the past but do not have statutes addressing posthumously conceived
children include: Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wyoming. 271 The newest version of the
Uniform Parentage Act, which was last amended in 2002, provides:
If an individual who consented in record to be a parent by
assisted reproduction dies before the placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent
of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented
in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after
death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the
child.272
Some states, like Iowa and Arkansas, already have case law
dealing with posthumously conceived children.273 Consequently, even
though there are no statutes on point, there is binding precedent making it
more difficult to convince a court to adopt a parentage rule similar to the
Uniform Parentage Act' S.274 Nonetheless, the law is constantly evolving
and persuasive advocacy may convince a court existing precedent is
275
erroneous.
There are also a number of states that have been influenced by the
Uniform Probate Code, but have yet to adopt statutes establishing a
posthumously conceived child's right to inherit from a deceased parent.276

268
269

See supra Part lII.A.ii (evaluating intestate succession).
See supra Part III.A.i (exhibiting how some statutes and cases strictly proscribe

posthumously conceived children from inheriting).
270 See supra Part lII.A.i. 1 (recognizing influence of uniform acts on different statutes).
271 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (citing states that have been influenced by
Uniform Parentage Act).
272 See Medford, supra note 53, at 105 (quoting Uniform Parentage Act).
273 See supra Part III.A.ii.2.c (exploring narrow approach).
274 See supra Part III.A.ii.2.c (indicating legislative intent governs).
275 See supra Part lII.A.ii (shedding light on developments in statutes and case precedent).
276 See supra note 96 (listing states influenced by Uniform Probate Code).
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For example: Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah have been influenced by the Uniform Probate Code; none of these
states have adopted the UPC's provisions regarding posthumously
conceived children.277 The Code states:
If . . . an individual is a parent of a child of assisted

reproduction who is conceived after the individual's death,
the child is treated as in gestation at the individual's death
for purposes of ... [intestate succession] .. . if the child is
...
in utero not later than 36 months after the individual's
death . . . or born not later than 45 months after the

individual's death. 2 8
Some states, like Massachusetts, have already established case
precedent consistent with the Uniform Probate Code's provision on
inheritance rights. 279 Accordingly, if a persuasive advocate can sufficiently
evidence the amount of a state's past reliance on the Uniform Probate
Code, a court may be convinced to adopt a similar approach until the state
legislature decides to act.28 °
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, children conceived after the death of one or both
parents have become increasingly more common through means of assisted
reproductive technology. An inherent issue with this phenomenon involves
the inheritance rights of such children regarding social security benefits and
under intestate succession. Under the Social Security Act, a posthumously
conceived child's right to benefits is contingent on their right to inherit
under state intestacy law. This is problematic because most state
legislatures have not specifically defined a posthumously conceived child's
right to inherit from a deceased parent. Additionally, most states have not
addressed whether a legal parent-child relationship even exists between a
posthumously conceived child and a decedent. Consequently, courts have
had to resolve these issues on their own.
277 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (highlighting states that have not adopted
provisions addressing posthumously conceived children).
278 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (2014).
279 See Woodward v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (Mass. 2002)
(highlighting broad approach adopted in Massachusetts).
280 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (recounting number of states influenced by
UPC).
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Ultimately, it has become increasingly clear that state law must
expressly permit children of postmortem conception to inherit through
intestate succession or be sufficiently ambiguous to permit such an
interpretation. In such instances, there are many things that should be
considered to successfully reproduce posthumously and to secure benefits
for any resulting children, such as: Getting married; Executing a Will;
Expedient conception post-death; and Taking advantage of the ambiguity
of domicile. Moreover, emphasizing a state's past reliance on model acts
like the Uniform Probate Code and/or Uniform Parentage Act may
persuade a court to adopt similar provisions in the interim.
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